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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
1.

Plaintiff/Appellant: Judy Price

2.

Defendant/Appellee: Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc.

3.

Pyggy, Inc. dba Market Source West is not a party to this appeal. The other
two parties to this appeal stipulated to dismiss Plaintiffs claims against
Pyggy, Inc. dba Market Source West reserving the right to list Pyggy, Inc.
dba Market Source West on the special verdict.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) (2010).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee was entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence of how long the
temporary hazard was in existence prior to Appellant's incident and therefore Appellant
was unable to show that Appellee had constructive notice of the temporary hazard.
B.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Appellee was entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence that Appellee
delegated its duty to use reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonable safe
condition to Market Source demonstrator Stephen Tyler.
C.

Whether the trial court correctly applied its discretion and avoided manifest

error in granting summary judgment to Appellee.
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appellate court accords no
deference to a trial court's legal conclusions but examines them for correctness.
Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Schurtz v. BMW of North Am., Inc., 814
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 is attached hereto in the
Addendum as Exhibit "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
NATURE OF TFIE CASE
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of a slip and fall of
Plaintiff and Appellant, Judy Price ("Price"), in a grocery store operated by Defendant
and Appellee, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. ("Smith's") on April 2, 2005, in Utah
County. (Amended Complaint, U 9, R. 100.)
II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
On or about May 15,2006, Price filed her Complaint in the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Civil No. 060401509 PI (Complaint, R. 5.) On or about August 3,2006, Smith's
2

filed its Answer to Price's Complaint. (Answer, R. 36.) On or about May 14. 2008, Price
filed her Amended Complaint. (Amended Complaint, R. 101.) On or about May 30,
2008, Smith's filed its Answer to Price's Amended Complaint. (Answer to Amended
Complaint, R. 153.) On or about November 4, 2008, Smith's filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 170; Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 251.) On or about November 26, 2008,
Price filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, and on or about December 9, 2008, Smith's filed its Reply Memorandum.
(Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
305; Defendant's Reply Memorandum, R. 370.) Oral arguments were held on March 2,
2009. The trial court issued its decision granting Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment
on April 13, 2009. (Decision, R. 538.) The trial court signed the Order granting Smith's
Motion for Summary Judgment on June 3, 2009. (Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment, R. 606.)
On or about May 4, 2009, Price filed her Notice of Appeal from the Trial Court's
Order. (Notice of Appeal, R. 584.) The Utah Supreme Court issued an Order on or about
May 14, 2009, transferring Price's summary judgment appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals. (Order, R. 594.)

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case arose out of an incident on April 2, 2005, in which Price slipped

and fell on water on the floor of a Smith's grocery store located in American Fork, Utah.
(Amended Complaint, % 9, R. 100.)
2.

Price's Amended Complaint names Smith's as a defendant and Pyggy, Inc.,

dba Market Source West ("Market Source") as a defendant. (Amended Complaint, f^[ 2-3,
R. 101.)
3.

In her Amended Complaint, Price brought four causes of action against

Smith's: negligence, negligence - vicarious liability, negligence - failure to supervise, and
res ipsa loquitur. (Amended Complaint, fflj 12-22, R. 98-99.) However, on appeal, Price
is only asserting two causes of action: negligence and negligence - vicarious liability.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 3, attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "B.")
4.

On April 2, 2005, Price and her granddaughter, Judy Chance, went to the

American Fork Smith's store to purchase strawberries. (Deposition of Judy Price, pp. 1819, R. 224-225.)
5.

After picking up the strawberries in the produce section of the store, the two

began walking toward the check stands. As they traveled in the direction of the check
stands, Price slipped and fell on a water spill that was outside of the produce section but
near the bread aisle. {Id. at 22, 26, 29, R. 221-223.)
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6.

Price does not know the time of the accident, though she thinks it could

have been u 5 something, 5:20, 5 something." {Id. at 19, R. 224.)
7.

The Smith's store manager. Chuck Brown, believes that Price fell at 5:00

p.m. or just minutes thereafter. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 44, R. 427.)
8.

Though Price did not notice the size of the water spill, Mr. Brown estimated

that the spill was approximately eight inches in diameter. Ms. Chance thought that the
spill could be as large as two 8-by-l 1-inch pieces of paper. (Deposition of Judy Price, p.
37, R. 216; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 47, R. 205; Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 32,
R. 202.)
9.

Price does not know how the water got on the store floor:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Do you know how water got on the floor before you
fell?
I didn't know there was water on the floor, so how
could I know how it got there?
Again, you'd just be guessing on what it was and how
that happened?
That's correct.

(Deposition of Judy Price, pp. 36, R. 217.)
10.

Price does not know how long the water had been on the floor prior to her

accident:
Q.
A.

Do you know how long the water had been on the floor
before you fell?
I have no idea. I didn't see the water. I have no - only
what people - what he said. I never - 1 never saw the
water.

5

* # *

Q.

A.
Q.
A.

So given that you learned after you felt it was water, do
you know how long that water had been on the floor
before you fell on it?
I have no - 1 have no idea, I mean That would just be speculation on your part?
Absolutely.

(Id. at 33-35, R. 218-220.)
11.

Price has no reason to believe that an employee knew of the water spill

prior to her accident:
Q.
A.

Do you know if any employee of the Smith's knew
about the water before your slipped on it?
I have no reason to believe they did. I have no idea.

(Mat 35-36, R. 217-218.)
12.

Price's granddaughter, Ms. Chance, does not know how the water got on

the store floor. She does not know how long it had been on the floor prior to Price's
accident. She does not know if any store employee knew of the water spill prior to
Price's accident. (Deposition of Judy Chance, pp. 33-34, R. 200-201.)
13.

When Mr. Brown initially arrived at the scene of the accident, he saw the

water spill and could not figure out how the water came to be on the floor. Upon
reflection, however, Mr. Brown guessed that the water spill came from a demonstrator for
Market Source, Stephen Tyler, who was demonstrating meats and cheeses from 12:00
p.m. to 5:00 p.m. at the store. Mr. Brown bases this assumption on his recollection that
he saw a cup of water on the demonstrator's table at approximately 4:00 p.m., that Price
6

slipped and fell in the area where the demonstrator had been demonstrating before leaving
at 5:00 p.m., and that there are no other nearby sources of water where Price slipped and
fell. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 32, 37, 44-45, R. 207-208, 426-427.)
14.

If the water came from Mr. Tyler as guessed by Mr. Brown in Mr. Brown's

deposition prior to Mr. Tyler's deposition, the water spill would have been on the store
floor a very brief time. Mr. Brown guesses that at the longest, the water could have been
present for 10 minutes. {Id. at 45, R. 426.)
15.

No store employee was aware of the water spill prior to Price's accident.

{Id. at 46, R. 425.)
16.

In addition to a culture of cleanliness and maintenance, the store has a

formal policy of inspecting its store floors at least once every hour to make certain that
the store is free from temporary hazards. {Id. at 16-17, R. 210-211.)
17.

On the day in question, the store inspected the store floors on eight separate

occasions from 4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m., as follows:
4:24 p.m., 4:26 p.m., 4:29 p.m., 4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p m.,
and 4:58 p.m.
The store inspected the store floors another four times during the five o'clock hour, as
follows:
5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., 5:57 p.m.
(Smith's Rule 26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures, Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.)
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18.

At his deposition, Mr. Tyler testified that he arrived at the Smith's store at

noon and left at 5:00 p.m. on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, p. 14,
attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "C")
19.

Mr. Tyler was adamant that he did not have a glass of water at his

demonstration table and that he did not spill any water on April 2, 2005. (Deposition of
Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.)
20.

Mr. Tyler stressed that water was not a component to his demonstration of

deli meats and cheeses and that a cup or bottle of water at the demonstration table would
pose a food safety risk. (Id. at 21-22, R. 178-179.)
21.

Mr. Tyler testified that while he was demonstrating at Smith's on the day of

the incident, he never saw anyone spill anything and he never saw any spill of any kind on
the floors of the Smith's store. (Id. at 28, R. 176.)
22.

Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's but was a demonstrator for

Market Source. (Id. at 6-7, R. 183-184.)
23.

Mr. Tyler was not compensated by Smith's in any way. Instead, he was

paid by Market Source. (Id. at 32, R. 175.)
24.

Market Source was a demonstration company that demonstrated product at

the request of the vendor or manufacturer of the product to be demonstrated. (Deposition
of Chuck Brown, p. 7, attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit "D.")
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25.

The demonstration company pays Smith's for the product that is

demonstrated. (Id. at 10, Addendum, Exhibit "D.")
26.

The demonstration company demonstrators do not work for Smith's. (Id. at

13, Addendum, Exhibit "D/')
27.

Smith's does not pay the demonstration company. Instead, the

demonstration company is paid by the vendor or manufacturer that hired the
demonstration company to demonstrate the product. (Id. at 19, Addendum, Exhibit "D.")
28.

As a demonstrator for Market Source, Mr. Tyler wore a Market Source

uniform consisting of a bow tie and apron and not a Smith's uniform as he demonstrated.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 11-12, R. 181-182.)
29.

As a demonstrator for Market Source, Mr. Tyler was not supervised by

Smith's employees. (Id. at 28, R. 176; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 10, R. 213.)
30.

As a demonstrator, Mr. Tyler did not receive assistance from Smith's

employees in setting up or taking down his demonstration within the Smith's store.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, p. 20, R. 180.)
31.

As a demonstrator, Mr. Tyler was responsible for bringing his own

equipment. The store did not provide anything but the product to be demonstrated, which
Market Source West had to purchase. (Id. at 12, R. 181; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p.
22, R. 209.)
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32.

Mr. Tyler had minimal interactions with store employees and operated

autonomously of the store as a third-party demonstrator. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler,
pp. 20, 23, 28, R. 176-177, 180; Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 10, 22, R. 209, 213.)
33.

Because Mr. Tyler was not an employee of the store, Smith's did not have

any policies or procedures that it required Mr. Tyler to follow while demonstrating within
the store. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 13, Addendum, Exhibit "D.")
34.

As a third-party demonstrator, Mr. Tyler was never supervised by any of the

various different grocery store chains such as Smith's, Wal-Mart, Macey's, and
Albertson's, and the store employees of those various grocery chains never checked on
Mr. Tyler to confirm that he had cleaned his demonstration area prior to his departure.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 38-40, R. 172-174.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
L

The law in Utah pertaining to slip and fall cases involving an unsafe

condition of a temporary nature that was neither created by the storeowner nor known to
be in existence by the storeowner requires that the plaintiff show that the storeowner had
constructive knowledge of the unsafe temporary condition because the condition had
existed long enough that the storeowner should have discovered it. Price was unable to
show that Smith's had constructive knowledge of the water spill that led to Price's
incident because there is no evidence as to how long the water spill was on the floor prior

10

to Price's incident. Consequentially, the trial court correctly granted Smith's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
II.

The law in Utah makes it clear that the trier of fact cannot be permitted to

speculate that a defendant is negligent. The trial court correctly granted Smith's Motion
for Summary Judgment because there is no evidence that Smith's was negligeut. With
absolutely no evidence, Price relies exclusively on speculation and conjecture regarding
the origin of the water spill on which Price slipped and fell as well as how long the water
spill was present on the floor prior to her incident.
III.

The trial court was correct in granting Smith's Motion for Summary

Judgment because there is no evidence that Smith's ever delegated its duty to maintain its
store in a reasonably safe condition to a third-party demonstrator from Market Source
who was demonstrating deli meats and cheeses on the day of the incident. There is also
no evidence that Market Source was an independent contractor retained by Smith's to
maintain or repair Smith's premises. Finally, there is no evidence that the demonstrator
was the origin of the water spill.
IV.

Smith's satisfied its duty to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition

on the day of the incident. Smith's did not create the water spill on which Plaintiff
slipped and fell at approximately 5:00 p.m. and was not on notice of the spill's presence
prior to the incident. Furthermore, Smith's performed eight formal floor inspections from
4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m. and four additional formal floor inspections in the five o'clock
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hour. With no evidence that Smith's failed to meet its duty to maintain its store in a
reasonably safe condition on the day of the incident, the trial court was correct in granting
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF HOW LONG THE
TEMPORARY HAZARD WAS IN EXISTENCE PRIOR TO THE
INCIDENT.
The Utah Supreme Court has held: "A major purpose of summary judgment is to
avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder." Reagan Outdoor
Advertising v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984). Similarly, the United States
Supreme Court held in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986):
"Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, that are designed to
'secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. at 327;
Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Summary
disposition of lawsuits is a valuable and necessary tool in a judicial system such as ours,
which strives for the efficient and timely resolution of legal disputes.").
Under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions establish that
12

there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law. Subsection (e) of Rule 56 further provides:
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him.
R. CIV. P. 56(e).

UTAH.

The United States Supreme Court has clarified this provision with respect to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical to the Utah rule.
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment
. . . based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself
not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakenly favors one side or the
other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff
on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to
a verdict....
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
The Supreme Court of Utah has held "that property owners are not insurers of the
safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees."
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Merely proving that an
accident occurred on the store's premises is insufficient to show that the store owner is
liable for the accident. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
13

In Jex v. JRA, Inc., the Utah Court of Appeals indicated that slip and fall cases fall
under two different categories: those involving an unsafe condition of a temporary nature
and those involving an unsafe condition of a permanent nature. Jex, 166 P.3d 655, 658
(Utah Ct. App. 2007). The Utah Court of Appeals held:
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only recover if the
defendant has notice of the dangerous condition. Specifically, the
following two conditions must be satisfied: (1) "that [the defendant] had
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge [ ] or
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that
he should have discovered it; and [(2)] that after such knowledge, sufficient
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied
it."
Id. (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)).
In the present matter, Price has conceded that Smith's did not create the water spill
and therefore the present matter falls under the temporary condition theory framework.
(Brief of Appellant, p. 10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") Price has also conceded that Smith's
did not have actual notice of the water spill. (Id., Addendum, Exhibit "B.") As a result,
Price must show that Smith's had constructive notice of the temporary hazard prior to
Price's incident in order to maintain her negligence claim. However, Price has failed to
meet her burden of proof and therefore her claim fails as correctly decided by the trial
court.
There is no evidence that Smith's had constructive notice and should have known
about the water spill prior to the incident because no one knows how long the water spill
had been on the floor prior to Price's fall. When asked how long the water had been on
14

the floor prior to her fall, Price testified that she had "no idea" and that it would be
speculation on her part. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 35, R. 218.) When Price's
granddaughter, Ms. Chance, was asked if she knew how long the spill had been on the
floor prior to Price's fall, she responded "no." (Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 33, R.
201.) Similarly, Smith's does not know how long the water had been on the floor prior to
Price's fail. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 46, R. 425; p. 45, R. 426.)
It is extremely difficult to guess how long the water spill was on the floor prior to
the incident because no one knows the origin of the spill. When Price was asked how the
water came to be on the floor, she responded: "I didn't know there was water on the floor,
so how could I know how it got there?" (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 36, R. 217.) Ms.
Chance also testified that she did not know how the water came to be on the floor.
(Deposition of Judy Chance, p. 33, R. 201.) When Smith's store director, Mr. Brown,
initially saw the water spill following the accident, he too could not figure out the origin
of the water spill though he later guessed that the Market Source demonstrator, Stephen
Tyler, spilled the water. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 32, 37, 44-45, R. 207-208, 426427.) However, Mr. Brown's guess that the Market Source demonstrator spilled the
water was only speculation and has been eliminated as a possibility by Mr. Tyler, who
testified unequivocally at his deposition that he did not even have water nor did he spill
water while at the store on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 2122, 28, 42, R. 171,176,178-179.)
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Of course, even if Mr. Brown's after-the-fact speculation was considered adequate
evidence to identify the origin of the spill, which it is not, Price still has no evidence as to
how long the water spill was on the floor prior to the incident. Price must add yet another
level of speculation on top of the previous conjecture. Even then, the result does not
support Price's argument for constructive notice. Price again relies on the guesses of Mr.
Brown who testified that if Mr. Tyler left at 5:00 p.m. and the spill was caused at that
time, then at the longest, the spill would have been present on the floor for 10 minutes.
(Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 45, R. 426.) Mr. Brown did not see, hear, or in any way
observe the spilling of the water. All of this speculation is strenuously denied by Mr.
Tyler who adamantly testified that he did not spill any water on the day of the incident.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.)
Based on Mr. Brown's speculation, however, the 10 minute estimate is the longest
period of time the water could have been present on the floor. The water in fact could
have been present just minutes or even seconds before Plaintiffs incident based on the
guesses made by Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown's guesses as to the origin of the water spill or
the time the water was on the floor prior to Plaintiffs incident is unsupported conjecture
that is inadequate in satisfying the constructive notice requirement within the temporary
condition theory framework.
In her brief, Price cites to Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah
1977) and argues that a plaintiff can still meet her burden of proof in instances where only
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tenuous facts exist as to the length of time the temporary hazard has been present. In
Ohlson, a store patron was injured from slipping and falling on dry spaghetti on the floor
of a grocery store. Unlike the present matter, however, the Ohlson case enjoyed abundant
evidence supporting a finding that the temporary hazard had been in existence for a
considerable period of time prior to the incident. In distinguishing the case from others in
which there was a lack of evidence that the temporary hazard had been present for any
appreciable time, the Utah Supreme Court stressed:
Here, the testimony was that the spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into
small pieces, and that it extended from aisle ten around the end of that aisle
into the main aisle for five or six feet toward the cash register at the front of
the store.
The only inspection of the area made by defendant's employees in the 45
minutes prior to plaintiffs injury was a casual glance down the aisle made
by defendant's manager as he came on duty, even though defendant knew
that the time at which the injury occurred was the busiest time for the store;
that more customers were present during that time; that debris was more
likely to find its way to the floor during this time; and that the debris Cciused
the kind of injury suffered by the plaintiff here. The main aisle in which
some of the spaghetti was strewn was visible from the positions of
employees at the cash register.
Ohlson, 568 P.2d at 754-755.
In the present matter, Price may not cite to any of the factors identified by the Utah
Supreme Court in the Ohlson decision to bolster her case. In Ohlson, the actual nature of
the spaghetti at the time of the incident indicated that it had been present on the floor for a
considerable period of time. The spaghetti was dirty, crushed, broken into small pieces,
and spread over a substantial area of the store floor. In contrast, the water spill in the
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present matter provides absolutely no hint into how long it was on the floor prior to
Price's fall. There is no evidence that the water spill was dirty or had been traveled
through which might imply its presence on the floor for some meaningful period of time.
In Ohlson, the Utah Supreme Court stressed that only a single casual glance down
the aisle in which the spaghetti lay had been made in the 45 minutes before the incident.
However, in the present matter, Smith's had undertaken 12 formal floor inspections from
4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. on the day of the incident, which took place at 5:00 p.m. or shortly
thereafter. The formal floor inspections took place at 4:24 p.m., 4:26 p.m., 4:29 p.m.,
4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p.m., 4:58 p.m., 5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., and
5:57 p.m. (Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) During none of these inspections was
the water spill discovered. Furthermore, Mr. Tyler testified that he never saw anyone
spill anything on the floor or observe any spill on the floor from noon until 5:00 p.m.
when he left the store on the day of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 28, R.
176.)
Though Price does not address opinions of her supermarket safety expert, Kent
Steele, in her argument, she does refer to his opinions in the Statement of Facts section as
well as the Summary of Argument section of her brief. At the time Smith's motion for
summary judgment was heard, Smith's also had an outstanding motion in limine in which
it requested that the trial court preclude Mr. Steele from testifying at trial. In its decision,
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the trial court stated that its decision to grant Smith's summary judgment rendered moot
Smith's motion in limine. (Decision, R. 538.)
In her brief. Price states that Mr. Steele opined that "demonstration areas are
typical areas to anticipate spillage" and that "Smith's conduct fell below the standard of
care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy [Mr. Tyler] left the demonstration area
clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out." (Brief of Appellant, p. 5, Addendum,
Exhibit "B.") However, Mr. Steele's opinions that Price cites in her brief do not change
the fact that Price is unable to identify free from speculation the amount of time the water
was on the floor. As a result, Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the constructive notice
requirement of the temporary condition theory framework established by Utah appellate
courts. As the trial court stated in its decision:
The lack of evidence regarding the length of time the puddle had been on
the floor when Plaintiff slipped is analogous to that of Jex. The fact that
Mr. Steele believes that Smith's should have inspected Mr. Tyler's area
upon his departure does not overcome the fatal flaw that Plaintiff has shown
no evidence of the length of time the puddle was on the floor. In the
absence of any such evidence, this court is unable to impute constructive
notice to Smith's regarding the presence of the water puddle on the floor.
(Decision, R. 533-534.)
In the present matter, there is no evidence in support of constructive notice. There
is no evidence as to who created the spill or how long the water spill was on the store
floor prior to Plaintiffs incident. There is only evidence that Smith's conducted 12
formal floor inspections from 4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. and never discovered the water spill,

19

as well as Mr. Tyler's testimony that during his stay from noon to 5:00 p.m. he never saw
any spill on the store floor. The Utah Supreme Court has stressed:
The mere presence of a slippery spot on a floor does not in and of itself
establish negligence. This condition may arise in any place of business for
any number of reasons. Proof that a slippery or wet substance was on a
floor, does not, without more, establish that defendant knew or should have
known of the condition.
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Having failed to produce evidence that Smith's should have known about the spill,
Price is unable to meet the first prong in Jex, which is necessary in order for Smith's to be
found negligent under the temporary condition theory framework. Therefore, the trial
court was correct in granting Smith's motion for summary judgment.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE
BASED ON SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the trier of fact cannot be permitted to
speculate that a defendant is negligent. In a case where there was only speculation
regarding the origin of an alleged hazard, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed summary
judgment in the defendant's favor. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co,, 284 P.2d 477 (Utah
1955). In Lindsay, a coffee shop patron was injured after slipping on water on the coffee
shop floor. Even though it was established that a waitress had delivered water in glasses
to plaintiff and her companion, there was no evidence as to whether the waitress, the
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plaintiff, her companion, or another patron spilled the water on the floor, or exactly when
it was spilled, or whether the management knew of its existence. Under these facts, the
Supreme Court of Utah ruled that:
[T]here was no evidence as to how the water got onto the floor, by whom it
was deposited, exactly when it arrived there or that the defendant had
knowledge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a jury cannot be
permitted to speculate that the defendant was negligent,
Lindsay, 284 P.2d at 478 (Utah 1955) (emphasis added).
Regrettably, Price was injured from slipping on a water spill found within the
Smith's store. That does not automatically mean that Smith's is at fault. See Dwiggins v.
Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) (holding that "[bjare allegations of
negligence unsupported by facts . . . are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary
judgment"). Price has conceded that Smith's did not cause the water spill and that
Smith's was not aware of the spill's presence prior to the incident. (Brief of Appellant, p.
10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") Without evidence that Smith's should have been aware of
the spill's presence, the trial court could not permit a jury to speculate that Smith's was
somehow negligent for Plaintiffs unfortunate accident. Because "a jury cannot be
permitted to speculate that [Smith's] was negligent," the trial court's order granting
Smith's summary judgment motion should be upheld. Lindsay, 284 P.2d at 478 (Utah
1955).
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED APPELLEE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE SMITH'S NEVER DELEGATED ITS DUTY TO
USE REASONABLE CARE TO MAINTAIN ITS STORE IN A
REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION.
Smith's does not dispute that as the storeowner Smith's possessed a duty to use
reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition. However, Smith's
never delegated to Market Source a nondelegable duty to use reasonable care to maintain
its store in a reasonably safe condition. In fact, Smith's did not delegate anything to
Market Source, which was neither employed, retained, nor paid by Smith's to demonstrate
deli meat and cheeses on the day of the incident.
Under Utah law, a storeowner possesses a duty to use reasonable care to maintain
its store in a reasonably safe condition. This duty does not impose upon a storeowner
strict liability for every incident that takes place within its store's walls. The Utah
Supreme Court has held 'that property owners are not insurers of the safety of those who
come upon their property, even though they are business invitees." Martin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). As previously addressed, the Utah
appellate courts have clarified the duty a storeowner possesses to reasonably maintain its
store as it pertains to temporary hazards. The Utah Court of Appeals had held:
Under the temporary condition theory, a plaintiff can only recover if the
defendant has notice of the dangerous condition. Specifically, the
following two conditions must be satisfied: (1) "that [the defendant] had
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge [ ] or
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that
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he should have discovered it; and [(2)] that after such knowledge, sufficient
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied
it."
Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Allen v. Federated
Daiiy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975)).
As addressed above, Price is unable to satisfy the constructive notice requirement
found within the temporary condition theory framework. Price has conceded that Smith's
did not create the water spill and that it did not have actual notice of the spill prior to the
incident. (Brief of Appellant, p. 10, Addendum, Exhibit "B.") There is also no evidence
that Smith's possessed constructive notice of the water spill because there is no evidence,
free of speculation, as to how long the spill was on the floor prior to the incident.
It is undisputed that Smith's never saw the water spill despite performing 12
formal floor inspections from 4:24 p.m. to 5:57 p.m. on the day of the incident. (Floor
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) It is also undisputed that Mr. Tyler testified that he never
spilled water, never saw anyone else spill anything on the floor, and that he did not see
any spills on the floor while he was present at the store from noon to 5:00 p.m. on the day
of the incident. (Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 28, R. 176.) Based on the foregoing,
Smith's may not be found liable under the temporary condition theory recognized by Utah
appellate courts.
In her brief, Price has emphasized the following statement from Prosser: "It is
generally agreed that the obligation as to the condition of the premises is of such
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importance that it cannot be delegated, and that the occupier will be liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance and repair."
Prosser, Law of Torts, § 395 (1971). This assertion might be of some significance if
hypothetically Smith's had retained Market Source to undertake construction, repair, or
maintenance of the store's premises. Smith's, however, never retained Market Source to
do anything and certainly did not entrust Mr. Tyler with the maintenance or repair of its
floor.
Market Source's lack of relationship to Smith's helps clarify that Smith's did not
entrust maintenance of its floor to Mr. Tyler on the day of the incident. Market Source
was not an independent contractor that Smith's retained to perform construction,
maintenance, or repair services. Instead, Market Source was a demonstration company
that was retained by vendors or manufacturers of various products to demonstrate those
products within grocery stores. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 7, Addendum, Exhibit
"D.") Market Source was paid by the vendor or manufacture that retained Market Source
to demonstrate the product. Therefore, on the day of the incident, Market Source was not
paid by Smith's to do anything. Instead, Market Source was paid by the vendor or
manufacturer of the deli meats and cheeses that were demonstrated. (Id. at 19,
Addendum, Exhibit "D.") Akin to a customer, at the conclusion of its demonstration,
Market Source paid Smith's for the product that was demonstrated. (Id. at 10,
Addendum, Exhibit "D.")
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Mr. Tyler was employed by Market Source and was not employed by Smith's.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 6-7, R. 183-184.) Mr. Tyler was not compensated by
Smith's in any way on the day of the incident. Instead, he was paid by Markel Source.
{Id. at 32, R. 175.) Because he was a Market Source demonstrator and was not employed
or retained by Smith's, Mr. Tyler had minimal interactions with Smith's and operated
autonomously of the store. {Id. at 20, 23, 28, R. 176-177, 180; Deposition of Chuck
Brown, pp. 10, 22, R. 209, 213.) Simply put, Mr. Tyler was another customer of Smith's
who paid for product that he in turn gave away to other customers patronizing Smith's.
The trial court correctly concluded:
The undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that Mr. Tyler was neither
an employee nor an agent of Smith's at the time of the accident. In her
memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff conceded for purposes of this motion
that Mr. Tyler was not an employee of Smith's and that he was not
compensated by Smith's in any way. However, even if Plaintiff had not
conceded this point, it is clear from the depositions of Mr. Brown and Mr.
Tyler that Mr. Tyler was employed by Market Source at the time of the
accident and has never been employed by Smith's. Nor is there any
evidence that Mr. Tyler had apparent or actual authority to act in behalf of
Smith's, thereby becoming its agent.
(Decision, R. 532.)
Despite this relationship between Smith's and Mr. Tyler in which Mr. Tyler did
not act as an employee or agent for Smith's, Price incorrectly claims that Smith's
delegated the duty of maintaining or cleaning its floor to Mr. Tyler. Price relies on the
deposition testimony of Mr. Brown who stated that the store expected the demonstrator to
clean up after he had concluded his demonstration. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 22,
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R. 209.) This testimony, particularly when it is placed in context, is insufficient to
support Price's claim that Smith's delegated the duty of maintaining its floor to Mr. Tyler.
Mr. Tyler was not an employee or agent of Smith's. Mr. Tyler did not work for a
floor maintenance company that was retained by Smith's. Instead, on the day of the
accident, Mr. Tyler was demonstrating deli meats and cheeses to Smith's customers. Mr.
Brown testified that Market Source was not even hired or retained by Smith's. He
certainly did not testify that Market Source had been retained to perform any maintenance
on Smith's floors. There is absolutely no evidence that Smith's retained Market Source to
wax, service, repair, inspect or clean Smith's floors.
Smith's did not delegate any absolute duty to Market Source. Smith's continued to
use reasonable care to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition as reflected in
Smith's conduct. On the day of the incident, Smith's performed 12 formal floor
inspections to check for any potential temporary hazards on its floors from 4:24 p.m. to
5:57 p.m. (Floor Inspection Report, R. 187-193.)
In her brief, Price has cited to a number of decisions within Utah in which Utah
appellate courts have referred to the concept of "nondelegable duty." However, none of
these decisions are relevant to the present matter because Smith's never delegated its
nondelegable duty to Market Source. Furthermore, in those decisions in which Utah
appellate courts found a nondelegable duty, the appellate courts proceeded to analyze the
cases based on the legal framework associated with the duty in question. In the present
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matter, the legal framework associated with the nondelegable duty Smith's owed to its
business invitees is the temporary condition theory as outlined in the Jex opinion. Where
Plaintiff is unable to show constructive notice, Smith's may not be found liable.
In her brief, Price also has cited to a number of cases outside of Utah in which
courts have held storeowners liable for the negligence of independent contractors they
have specifically retained to perform maintenance or repair work in their stores:
Lilienthal v. Hastings Clothing Co., 280 P.2d 824, 828 (Cal App. 155) (maintenance
contractor charged with waxing the store's floors); Gill v. Krassner, 11 A.2d 462 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (maintenance contractor charged with waxing the store's
floors); Goodman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 129 A.2d 405 (D.C. App. 1957) (construction
company charged with performing construction work to store); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126
N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1964) (altercation contractor charged with store remodel): Lipman
Wolfe & Co. v. Teeples & Thatcher, Inc., 522 P.2d 467 (Or. 1974) (independent
contractor charged with repair of occupier's premises); Bryant v. Sherm 's Thunder bird
Market, 522 P.2d 1383 (Or. 1974) (contractor hired to install refrigeration cases in store);
Huddleson v. Lerman, 73 A.2d 596 (N J. Super. 1950) (contractor retained to wax store's
floor); Little v. Butner, 348 P.2d 1022 (Kan. 1960) (employee of occupier created hazard
through meat sample demonstration). None of the decisions are even remotely relevant
to the present matter because Market Source was never retained, employed, or acted as an
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agent on behalf of Smith's. Furthermore, Market Source was not charged by Smith's
with performing any maintenance or repair work within the Smith's store.
If Price is successful in broadening vicarious liability of a storeowner to cover all
possible negligence performed within its store by all third persons, regardless of whether
the third persons are employees or agents of the store or retained to perform maintenance
or repair work at the store and regardless of the store having notice of the temporary
hazard created, Smith's and every other storeowner will essentially be held strictly liable
for every incident that takes place within store walls. That is expressly not the law in
Utah. The Supreme Court of Utah has held "that property owners are not insurers of the
safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees."
Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). Merely proving that an
accident occurred on the store's premises is insufficient to show that the store owner is
liable for the accident. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Price's nondelegable duty argument is also thwarted from the lack of evidence that
Mr. Tyler created the temporary hazard. There is no evidence identifying the origin of the
water spill. Price and her granddaughter both admitted that they did not know who
caused the spill. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 36, R. 217; Deposition of Judy Chance, pp.
33-34, R. 200-201.) Plaintiff is relying exclusively on the after-the-fact guess Mr. Brown
made in deposition that Mr. Tyler was the source of the spill. However, Mr. Brown's
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guess was mere conjecture and speculation that was resolved as incorrect by Mr. Tyler
who stressed that he did not have, nor did he spill, any water on the day of the incident.
(Deposition of Stephen Tyler, pp. 21-22, 28, 42, R. 171, 176, 178-179.)
With no evidence supporting a finding that Market Source was an agent for
Smith's, that Smith's entrusted Market Source with the maintenance of its floors, or that
Market Source was the source of the water spill, Price's nondelegable duty argument fails
and the trial court was correct in granting Smith's motion for summary judgment.
IV.
SMITH'S SATISFIED ITS DUTY TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO
MAINTAIN ITS STORE IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION.
As a storeowner, Smith's possesses a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining its
store in a reasonably safe condition. On the day of the incident, Smith's satisfied this
duty and therefore may not be held liable for Price's unfortunate incident.
In addition to a culture of cleanliness and maintenance, Smith's has a formal
policy of inspecting its store floors at least once every hour to make certain that the store
is free from temporary hazards. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 16-17, R. 210-211.)
Price's incident took place at approximately 5:00 p.m. (Deposition of Judy Price, p. 19,
R. 224; Deposition of Chuck Brown, p. 44, R. 427.) From 4:24 p.m. to 4:58 p.m. on the
day of the incident, Smith's performed eight formal floor inspections (4:24 p.m., 4:26
p.m., 4:29 p.m., 4:33 p.m., 4:34 p.m., 4:43 p.m., 4:50 p.m., 4:58 p.m.) during which
Smith's employees walked through the entire store looking for temporary haz<irds on the
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floor that could be remedied. (Deposition of Chuck Brown, pp. 16-17, R. 210-211; Floor
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.) During the five o'clock hour, Smith's conducted another
four formal floor inspections (5:12 p.m., 5:38 p.m., 5:55 p.m., 5:57 p.m.). (Floor
Inspection Report, R. 187-193.)
The mere fact that an incident took place at Smith's does not mean that Smith's
was negligent. The Utah Supreme Court has stressed:
As previously noted, a store owner is charged with the duty to use
reasonable care in maintaining the floors of his or her establishment. This
court's comments in Long are equally applicable to the case at hand: "[I]f
[the store owner's] duty required further safety measures, we are made to
wonder .. . how far the defendant would have to go in protecting the
customers, both in method and in area. There does not appear to be any
reasonable and practical answer to that inquiry." Long v. Smith Food King
Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973).
As this court has often stated in other cases, it is regrettable that plaintiff
suffered injuries. However, "[n]ot every accident that occurs gives rise to a
cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from
someone. Thousands of accidents occur every day for which no one is liable
in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the ones who are
injured." Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1977).
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 479-480 (Utah 1996).
On the day of the incident Smith's was cognizant of its duty to reasonably maintain
the store premises in a reasonably safe condition and took consistent safety measures to
satisfy its duty as evidenced by the 12 fomial floor inspections undertaken from 4:24 p.m.
to 5:57 p.m. While it is unfortunate that Price was involved in an incident involving a
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water spill of unknown origin that had been on the floor for an unknown period of time,
there is absolutely no evidence that Smith's was negligent or liable for the incident.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing. Defendant and Appellee, Smith's Food & Drug Centers,
Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the Trial Court granting Smith's Motion for
Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment be affirmed, the appeal of Price be
dismissed, and Smith's be awarded its costs on appeal.
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT "A"

Westlaw.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56

Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*S_Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*S Part VII. Judgment
-• RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof.

(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.

(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7.
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole
case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts
exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to
which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.

(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the
party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may
refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented m bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

CREDIT(S)

[Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.]

CROSS REFERENCES

Motion for summary judgment, see Rules Civ. Proc, Form 21.

LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES

Learning professionalism and civility-Thoughts for new members of the bar. Judge Derek P. Pullan, 18 Utah B.J. 32
(August 2005).

Unsworn declarations in lieu of affidavits: Increasing efficiency of practice under the Utah Rules of Criminal and
Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence. John H. Bogart, Scott D. McCoy, 20 Utah B.J. 22 (July/August,
2007).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

Judgment € ^ > n 8 to 190.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 228kl78 to 228kl90.
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 243 to 254, 260 to 274.
C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 183.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Encyclopedias

Am. Jur.2d Products Liability § 1687, Answers.

Forms
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hip injury that requires surgery. Mrs. Price brought several causes of action against
Smith's but appeals only in regard to two of those causes: first, that the store was
negligent when it failed to inspect an area of the store where it had allowed an
independent contractor to work for the day; and second, that the store should be
vicariously liable for the negligence of the independent contractor for causing the
hazardous puddle. The Fourth District Court for the State of Utah granted Smith's
Motion for Summary Judgment on both counts mentioned above concluding as a matter
of law that, under either theory of liability, Mrs. Price would be unable to recover.
The issues before this court are, first, whether Mrs. Price presented sufficient
evidence of the length of time the water was on the floor to establish constructive notice;
and second, whether the store can be vicariously liable for the negligence of an in-store
food demonstrator (independent contractor) for harm to Mrs. Price caused by the
demonstrator's failure to clean up the floor after the demonstration.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 2, 2005, Steven Tyler, an employee of a food demonstrator Pyggy, Inc.,
d.b.a. Market Source West., (hereinafter "Pyggy") spent the day handing out meat and
cheese to customers in Smith's American Fork store. R. 248. Pyggy brought its own
demonstration equipment and table, but purchased the food samples from Smith's. R.
247.

3

298. Mr. Brown concluded this because Ms. Price fell at the site of the demonstration
table, and because he noticed a cup of water on the demonstration table when he went to
talk to Mr. Tyler earlier in the day. R. 298. Mr. Brown stated he was almost 100% sure
the water came from Mr. Tyler's table. R. 298. There is no other evidence suggesting
any other source of the spilled water. R. 298, 426-27.
Mr. Brown also testified that he thought the water was on the floor for maybe 10
minutes. R. 301,278.
Mr. Brown testified that the water was cleaned up easily with a paper towel. R.
278-279.[
After the incident in which Ms. Price slipped and fell on the puddle of water,
Pyggy went out of business and was found not to have insurance. Transcript of Oral
Arguments at 25.
Mrs. Price's supermarket safety expert, Kent Steele, opined that demonstration
areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage. R. 254. Mr. Steele also opined that Smith's
conduct fell below the standard of care because Smith's failed to verify that Pyggy left
the demonstration area clean and spill free when Pyggy checked out. R. 252.

Page 45 of Alan Brown's deposition was attached to Mrs. Price's Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment but was not numbered as part of the paginated
record. However, that page of Mr. Borwn's deposition fell between pages 279 and 279 of the
paginated record.
5

sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have
remedied it.
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975).
Here, since it is undisputed that Smith's did not create the water spill in the present
matter, nor did it have actual notice of the water spill (R. 245), this brief discusses
constructive notice as the basis of Smith's liability for ordinary negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that even where there are only tenuous facts
about the length of time the dangerous condition existed, the plaintiff can still meet her
burden. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court
affirmed the trial court's determination that the jury could find constructive notice—
evidence of the amount of time the dangerous condition existed—where the only
evidence of the time the dangerous condition existed was^the condition of the broken
spaghetti on the floor).
In holding that Plaintiffs negligence claim (based on constructive notice) should
fail, the trial court emphasized the importance of the time factor in determining whether
constructive notice can be imputed to Smith's. R. 534. The trial court quoted the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in J ex v. JRA, Inc., 196 P.3d 576, 581 (Utah 2008):
To establish that a temporary condition existed long enough to give a store owner
constructive notice of it, a plaintiff must present evidence that it had been there for
an appreciable time. We have therefore imputed constructive notice to a store
owner only when there is some evidence of the length of time the debris had been
on the floor.
10
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1

question.

2

A.

Okay.

2

the approximate dates of your employment at Market Source

3

Q.

And I'll assume that if you don't ask me to

3

West?

1

4

reask the question that you understood the question. Is

5

that fair?

6

A.

Yeah. Yes.

Q.

Perfect. Did you review any documents in

7
8

preparation for this deposition 7

9

A.

No.

0

Q.

Okay. I imagine that you didn't speak with

1

4

A.

Okay. How long--could you provide me with

Oh, gosh. I'd probably been there a year.

5

So it would have been — oh, I can't remember, it's been

6

such a long time.

7

Q.

Okay.

8

A.

2004 sometime. I don't know.

Q.

So sometime in 2004 is when you began your

9

anyone about this deposition 7

10

work at Market Source West?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And when did you stop your employment at

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

Okay. Steve, do you keep a journal or diary 7

13

4

A.

No, I don't.

14

Q.

So you wouldn't have any journal or diary

5

Q.

15

Market Source West?
A.

I t was actually shortly after that because my

car got taken, so...

6

entries regarding the event that took place on April 2nd,

16

Q.

So shortly after April 2nd, 2005?

7

2005?

17

A.

Yeah, that is correct. I wish I had my

8

A.

No.

18

9

Q.

Okay. Just s o m e really quick b a c k g r o u n d

19

>0

Q.

20

i n f o r m a t i o n . Could y o u g i v e m e y o u r full n a m e ?

!1

resume, I would have been more efficient on the dates.

21

No, no. I appreciate that.
Hey, Steve, have you ever been employed by

Smith's?

A.

Yes, Steven Lee Tyler.

12

Q.

Okay. And your current address?

22

A.

No.

13

A.

750 South 6 5 0 West, Apartment 3 6 2 , Provo,

23

Q.

Okay. What was your position at Market

14

Utah 8 4 6 0 1 .

15

Q.

24

And, Steve, who resides there with you?

Source West?

25

A.

I was a self-employed demo-er.

5

7

1

A.

My wife and my daughter and me.

1

2

Q.

Okay. And your date and place of birth?

2

A.

Washington — Bellingham, Washington. I w a s

3
4

born October 8th, 1979.

5

Q.

Okay. Steve, could you give me your

Q.

And could you tell me what your job duties

entailed as a demo-er?

3

A.

Just basically sample out the food that they

4

gave me to sample. So t h a t day it was meat and cheese

5

and...

6

educational background? Did you graduate from high

6

7

school?

7

Q.

Okay. Now, Steve, you mentioned you were a

self-employed demo-er for —

8

A.

Yeah, that's about it.

8

A.

Well, yeah. W e had W-9 Forms.

9

Q.

Where did you graduate from high school?

9

Q.

Okay. Who was your supervisor at Market

L0

A.

Ebo School District.

10

11

Q.

And then any education following that formal

11

12

education?

13
14

A.

through Mountain West Trucking School.

15
16

12
Just my truck driver's license, which w a s

Q.

Steve, let me ask you: Are you currently

13

A.

Oh, goodness. That would have been — I

can't remember her name. I t ' s been, I mean, a few years.
Q.

Understood. And the name of the supervisor

14

you had, is that a name that you could get through some

15

documentation you have at home or in some way?

16

employed?

Source West?

A.

No.

17

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

No. Okay.

18

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

I mean, not — I would have to happen to just

19

A.

I work for Yellow Cab of Provo.

19

20

Q.

How long nave you been working for Yellow

20

22

A.

Just like a month or so, not very long.

22

23

Q.

And, Steve, on April 2nd, 2005, were you

23

21

24
25

21

Cab"?

employed by Market Source West?
A.

Yes.
6

like trip over something. That's the only way.
Q.

Steve, as a demo-er, what training did you

receive?
A.

Zero training.

Q.

Okay. So you were — you began working on

24

behalf of Market Source West and they just sent you out

25

to demo?
8

1

A.

Basically, yeah.

1

2

Q.

Okay

2

3

A.

Because they need people really bad alt the

4

time.
Q.

Q.

; 3
4

5

A.

Was there like a brief video that you watched

: 5

Just when and where we're supposed to be.

And they'd let us know within 24 hours.
Would they let you know through this

paperwork in 24 hours or would you receive a telephone
call?

6

for training, or did you tram with another individual

6

7

briefly?

7

they'd send the paperwork and we'd have it, like, the
next day.

8

A.

Nothing.

8

9

Q.

No

9

In the application process or the hiring

10

process, did they provide you with a list of

10

11

responsibilities that you would have 7

11

Q.

We'd receive a telephone call, and then

Would the paperwork identify a contact at the

grocery store?
A.

No. We knew, basically, who — we'd just

Yeah. I think they gave us like a little

12

talk to the manager. So it's just — you know. And they

13

paper saying, you know, the clothes you have to wear, you

13

know, you know, like if it's in the grocery side, talk to

14

know, stuff like that.

14

the grocery manager. So it was just — there wasn't a

15

certain person.

16

Q.

12

15
16

A.

A.

Q.

Okay. Would this paper have identified

briefly what you're supposed to do as a demo-er?

17

A.

Yeah, very briefly. I mean, that's about it.

17

18

Q.

Would you have this paper?

18

And with the call or the paperwork, would

they identify briefly what you would be demo-ing?
A.

Yeah.

19

A.

No.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

Q.

No. Okay.

20

A.

I t would say meat, cheeses or, you know,

21

A.

I wish I did, but no.

21

22

Q.

Okay. Did you ever go out with another

22

23
! 24
25

demo-er to demo things so that you saw what that person
was doing?
A.

Huh-uh, no.

Q.

As a demo-er, would you go to various stores

toilet — whatever.
Q.

Okay. Let me ask you: Did Market Source

23

West provide you with any equipment to take when you

24

would go demo-ing?

25

A.

An apron and bowtie. That's about it.

1

Q.

Okay. An apron and a bowtie

9

11

or were you assigned a specific store?

Who provided,

2

like -- I'm assuming with demo-ing that sometimes you

3

would be placing things on tables

County. I even worked in Salt Lake County a couple of

4

accurate?

times. I t just depends on where they need you.

5

A.

Yeah.

6

Q.

And who would provide the table?

7

A.

Oh, I did.

8

Q.

Okay

A.

Q.

Anywhere. I could work anywhere in Utah

Okay. But, primarily, you worked in Utah

County?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Were you assigned to a particular grocery

9

store chain?

10

Would that be

So would that be through Market Source

West or that was just your own table?
A.

That's my own table. Anything other than the

A.

No.

11

apron and the bowtie, w e had to do ourselves. So if I

Q.

So it could be any?

12

had to go buy something for it, tax write-off, but...

A.

I t could be any. I worked at Wal-Mart. I

13

Q.

So you were responsible for everything

worked at Macey's. I t ' s just wherever they have accounts

14

necessary for demo-ing the product except for your

through.

15

uniform, which included a bowtie and an apron?

Q.

Okay. Do you know how many — let me ask:

Was there a headquarters someplace that you would go to,

16

A.

Right.

17

Q.

Okay. When you would go to a grocery store,

or were you just simply called from your own home and

18

was the grocery store responsible for anything but the

sent directly to a different location?

19

product you would be demo-ing?

A.

Yeah, we w e r e called from our house and

20

they'd send us the paperwork.

Q.

21

Okay.

22

A.

But it wasn't...

23

Q.

When they sent you paperwork, what would that

24

Paperwork entail?

25
10

|

A.

No, not usually. I t would be a pretty rare

occasion if they were.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Like, say you didn't have something and the

store just happened to have it, you lucked out. But, no.
Q.

I see. So you were expected, as the demo-er,
12

1

to bring everything necessary to demo the product 7
Right.

1

occasion?

2

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay. How did you know that you arnved at

2

A.

3

Q.

Okay.

3

4

A.

And on a rare occasion I forgot something,

4

5

and they'd be kind enough to, like, lend me a tablecloth

5

6

or something like that.

6

7

Q.

Okay. I see.

7

8

A.

Nothing substantial.

8

9

Q.

What were the things that you would

9

the store at 12:00?
A.

Because that's the standard time we always

arrived.

j

Q.

Oh, okay.

A.

And we always left — the longest shift we

had was five hours. So it's pretty set down that we

0

generally — what was your work equipment that you would

10

leave — we come at this time and we leave at this time.

1

generally bring to a demo? A table? Would that be

11

I t would be very rare to get a morning demo, so...

2

standard?

3

A.

12
A table is always standard. A tablecloth is

Q.

Okay. And so do you have an independent

13

recollection of arriving at 12:00 and leaving at 5:00, or

14

are you just assuming that that was the case because that

5

Q.

Okay.

15

was the usual?

6

A.

Gloves standard. That's about it.

16

7

Q.

Let me ask: Would you bring a cooler or

17

4

always standard.

8

something to keep the product that you were demoing cool

9

if it required cooling?
A.

0

18

A.

No, that's when I was there. I just...

Q.

So you arrive at the Smith's at 12:00. What

do you do when you get to the store 7

19

I f it required cooling. Or if they had —

A.

We find the manager we need to do and we find

the product, we count it, and then we just start our
demo.

1

you know, like in the meats and cheese case, they had

21

their case right there, so I just stuck it in their case.

22

Q.

Okay.

3

And it was just plain and simple.

23

A.

Set up our table.

24

Q.

Do you recall finding the manager on this

5

Q.

Okay. Steve, because we're dealing with —

and on a telephone call that we had where I identified

25

date?

13
1

i

20

2

4

15

the purpose for this deposition, you're aware that this

1

2

lawsuit involves an accident that took place at the

2

to the meat counter. And I don't think — I think I just

3

American Fork Smith's store on April 2nd, 2005?

3

talked to the deli, and they already knew that that's
what was going to go on, so...

A.

I don't think I did that date. I just went

4

A.

Right, yes.

4

5

Q.

Okay. Do you have an independent

5

Q.

Okay. And they give you product?

6

A.

Yeah, they weigh it out.

Q.

Let me ask: What is it that -- why do you

6

recollection of that day?

7
8
9

A.

I know I left at 5:00, and I know I came at

12:00.

8

have an independent recollection of this particular day?
Is there something that —

Okay. So you came at 12:00 and you left at

9

0

5:00. Do you remember anything else? I mean, do you

10

A.

1

remember what you were assigned to demo?

11

particular day.

12

Q.

Oh, okay. So your car was repossessed?

2

Q.

7

A.

Yeah, it was meats and cheese. I don't

Yeah, my car got repossessed on that

3

remember exactly what — yeah, I don't. I don't remember

13

A.

After, on the way home.

4

what meats and what cheeses I did, but...

14

Q.

Okay.

Okay. Let me ask you — so you received —

15

A.

Yeah, that's why I remember that day.

6

you received paperwork or a telephone call to go to that

16

Q.

Okay.

7

American Fork Smith's on April 2nd, 2005?

17

A.

Unfortunately, that was not a good day for

Q.

No, understood. The car was repossessed.

5

Q.

8

A.

Yeah.

18

9

Q.

Had you ever worked at that American Fork

19

0

Smith's before?

20

1

A.

I don't think before then, huh-uh.

21

2

Q.

Had you worked at that store after this day,

22

3

April 2nd, 2005?

23

4

A.

Huh-uh.

24

given product — meat product, then — did you say you

5

Q.

So you worked at American Fork Smith's on one

25

count the product?

14

me.

Was it repossessed in the Smith's parking lot?
A.

No, I was driving home and I was almost home

and — yeah.
Q.

j

Okay. So you go to the meat counter, you're

16

1
2

A.

Q.

3
4

Well, w e counted the product before we

started to see how much we sell.
Okay

And then set up

On this day, do you

recall what you set up 7

A.

Gosh, I'm trying to think.

Q.

And we don't need you to guess

3

a good idea, that would be helpful

4

remember --

If you have

If you can't

5

A.

The table and the tablecloth.

5

A.

I can't remember exactly where it was at.

6

Q.

Okay

6

Q.

Okay

A.

There wasn't anything else, really, to set

A.

I know it was like in the front doors

7
8

Q.

Would you have brought a cooler on that day 7

1 10

A.

Nor because I knew I had the cold case that I

\ 1 1

Q.

9
10
11

could put the meat in.

12

7
8

up.

9

Anything other than a table, tablecloth

7

I'm

12

somewhere, just past the front doors.
Q.

So you're stationed right in front of the

meat counter^
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay

And were you at the end -- were you

13

wondering, do you provide like paper plates or napkins or

13

stationed in front of the meat counter, just at the end

14

things like that 7

14

of one of the meat — my goodness, I'm rambling

15

A.

They give us toothpicks to sample stuff.

15

ask that question again

16

Q.

And is that provided by Smith's 7

16

A.

No problem.

17

A.

No, that's from the demo company, I think.

17

Q.

You were in front of the meat counter

18

18

Q.

I see

A.

Or we buy them ourselves. I can't remember

you at one of the ends of the meat counter

Let me

19

A.

I was basically in the center of it.

if they were the ones that the demo company gave me or if

20

Q.

Okay

21

I bought them myself.

21

A.

Yeah.

22

Q.

When you looked out from your demo table,

Q.

22
23
2 4

Where did you set up — and, you know, Tyler

You were in the center of it 7

what were you looking at 7

I apologize, I didn't bring a blank piece of paper. Or

23

actually, I've got a whole stack of it

24

A.

I think it was the produce —

25

Q.

Okay. So you're stationed —

MR. YOUNG: I can get one without lines if

25

17
1

Were

7

20

19

I

1
2

1

1

you need it.

2
Q.

3

19

MR. EDWARDS: I don't think there's a need

2

(BY MR. EDWARDS) Would you mind drawing a

3

A.

— If I remember correctly.

Q.

Okay. Right in front of the meat counter far

enough away, though, that individuals could go —

4

bird's eye view of the store 7 And what I'm interested in

4

A.

Yeah.

5

is you identifying where you set up this table to demo on

5

Q.

— around you and order things at the meat

6

counter

7

7

produce area 7

6

that day

7
8

19
10

A.

Do you remember

7

I t was right in front of the deli counter.

Like, here's the deli counter and then you have — I set
my table out like a few feet from there just so it was
easy access, so I wouldn't have to move around as much.

11

Q.

So would you have sat the table where

8
9
10

And you were looking, you believe, at the

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Okay. Did any Smith's employee assist in

setting up your demo table 7

11

A.

No, they never do.

12

customers would generally go to purchase meat or things

12

Q.

Okay. You talked to someone at the meat

13

like that 7

13

14

A.

Yeah. I was out like a foot or so from the

14

A-

The product.

Q,

Okay. You didn't talk to anyone else about,

15

counter. So they could get in if they needed to buy the

15

16

meat that I was demo-mg.

16

17
18

Q.

Okay

Could someone go past you and still

select something at the counter

19

A.

7

counter to get the product 7

17
18

Oh, yeah.

19

"Hey, I'm here. Where do you want me 7 "
A.

No.

Q.

Did the meat people tell you where to set up

the table or was that your choice 7

20

Q.

Or did you block their —

20

A.

That's my choice.

21

A.

Oh, no, I didn't block their process at all.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

Q.

Do you recall the store enough that you could

22

A.

They don't have much say in what we do, they

23

just identify the rough location of where that — of

23

24

where that meat counter would have been in the store, or

24

Q.

Okay.

25

A.

I mean, sometimes a store manager will come

25

no

7

18

just give us the product.

20

L

and say, "Hey, you know, you can't be there." But, no,

1

try, personally, to be close to like a fountain or

I

it doesn't really happen.

2

somewhere where I could just get drinks.

3

Q.

Okay.

3

4

A.

Usually it's our say, what happens.

4

5

Q.

Do you have a chair?

5

5

A.

No.

6

7

Q.

No. So you've got a table, tablecloth. Do

3

Q.

A.

8

9

A.

No.

0

Q.

Steve, was there — did you need water for

Probably none, except to ask for meats and

cheeses, if needed.

7

you put mats down, or no?

Okay. Over the course of that day, how many

communications would you have with store employees?

Q.

Okay. Do you recall specifically if you had

any conversation that day or you —

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

So you don't remember?

1

the demo that you were undertaking that day? Would water

11

A.

I don't remember.

2

have been a —

12

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

Not at all.

13

A.

If—sorry.

4

Q.

-- component?

14

Q.

No, no. That's fine. Steve, I imagine that

5

A.

Not to my knowledge.

15

you wouldn't be able to identify or remember the name of

6

Q.

Let me ask: When you go to these demos for

16

any employee that you spoke with at the meat counter?

7

five hours, do you take like — do you take like a lunch

17

8

or-

A.

No.

18

Q.

Okay. You departed at 5:00?

9

A.

Yeah, we get a half-hour lunch.

19

A.

Yep. I was out the doors at 5:00.

0

Q.

Okay.

20

Q.

You're out the doors at 5:00. When would

1

A.

And then...

21

you — when do you start putting down or taking the table

2

Q.

You don't eat the lunch right at the demo

22

down and...

3

station, do you?

23

14

A.

No, no, no. That's against — yeah.

24

all the meat product, go pay for the meat product or

15

Q.

Is that against the rule?

25

cheese, whatever the product is.

A.

About 4:40. That gives us; time to recount

21
1

A.

Yeah. You can't eat — you close up your

23
1

2

table and you go. You either can leave the store or you

2

3

go sit in their break room or whatever.

3

4
5

Q.

Okay. Is that something that you were told

by Market Source West, that's something you can't do?

Q.

Okay. The table you bring, is that just a

folding, cardboard table?

4

A.

Yeah.

Q.

You fold up the cardboard table, you recount

5

the meat product. Is there — when you would be cleaning

6

A.

Yeah. Well, it's also food safety.

6

up, would you look to see that the area was dean of

7

Q.

Let me ask you: On that day, do you know —

7

debris?

8

would you have had water at your table just for yourself

8

9

to drink, a bottle of water?

9

10
11
12

A.

We're not allowed to do that either because

it's a food safety issue.
Q.

So is that something that Smith's told you

over or whatever, so we'd have to clean up that mess.

11

And so, yeah.

12

not to do, or is that something that Market Source West

13

14

would tell you?

14

A.

That's my personal — any food demos, I

Yeah. I mean, if we dropped any papers, we

10

13

15

A.

had a little garbage can. Sometimes people kicked it

Q.

Did Market Source West tell you when you left

that you needed to clean up the area?
A.

No, that's just something that you do. You

15

don't want to leave a mess so other people have to clean

16

didn't keep — because I'd cooked before. And so just

16

it up.

17

that's my personal belief. I don't drink anything.

17

18

Q.

18

So you wouldn't have had a can of soda, a

Q.

And you mentioned a garbage can. Is that

something that you would bring?

19

bottle of water or anything for water or liquid at that

19

20

demo table?

20

the stores would have, like, an extra garbage can sitting

21

somewhere.

21

A.

If I remember correctly, there's like a

22

drinking fountain somewhere around there. So I'd just go

23

get a drink when needed.

22
23

24

Q.

Okay.

24

25

A.

And that's another thing. We try to — or I

25

22

A.

Q.

I t depends. Sometimes we would and sometimes

Okay. And that was fairly standard to have a

garbage can close to the demo table?
A.

Yeah.

Q.

Do you recall, on that day, whether you
24

1

brought your own garbage or whether you borrowed a

1

trying — except for the "very good." But, yeah, that's

2

garbage can from the store?

2

all my handwriting.

3
4

A . I think I just used like a paper sack with a
plastic bag in it. So it was all done by then.

5
6

8
9

13

6

Q.

Okay.

Yeah.

7

A.

That's done by the company.

Q.

People could take whatever they're eating,

8

Q.

Okay. At the top line you can see dates of

A.

Q.

A.

15

Q.

Right. Or if they didn't like the product,

Okay. So you would begin cleaning up at

22
23

time of demo, 11:00 to 5:00.
A.

That's w e i r d .

12

Q.

Would 11:00 be the time that you arrived?

13

A.

Yeah, it would have to be, if that's w h a t

this says. I was always on time or, if not, five minutes

You would recount the product. Was that the

15

early.

then hand it back to the meat department?

21

demo, Saturday, April 2nd, 2005. Next to that you see

14

17

19

I didn't w r i t e that.

Um-humm.

first step of cleaning up? You'd recount the product and

20

10

A.

11

16

18

5

9

4:40, you would be out the door by 5:00?

14

your handwriting?

A.

they'd dump it in there.

12

The "customer response, very good" is not

And you would have that just next to the demo

toss the toothpick?

10
11

4

Q.

Q.
table?

7

3

16
17

Q.

Okay. And so you're not thinking that you

were there at 12:00, I mean —

A.

Usually I would actually fold up the table

18
19

Q.

— based on the form?

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

Yeah, based on the form.

A.

And then — because that shows, "Hey, we're

21

Q.

Okay. Steve, do you recall how busy that

first.

done with the demo, there's no more samples. 1 '
Q.

Okay. And then after folding up the table,

22

A.

I t must be 1 1 : 0 0 .

store was on that day?

23

A.

I t was actually pretty slow.

Q.

Okay.

24

what do you do?

24

25

A.

We go weigh the product or count the product.

25

A.

I t wasn't very busy that day.

1

Q.

Okay. And where would the table be that you

1

Q.

Steve, would you have left the store earlier

27

25

2

would fold up? Would it just be next to t h e - -

2

3

A.

No, I'd take it out to my car.

3

4

Q.

You'd take it out, and then you weigh and

4

5
6
7
8
9

5

count the product?

Do you recall any communications with any

Q.

And then do you communicate with any store

7

A.

No, not a t all.

8

Q.

Okay. Over the course of your demo-ing, did

employee before leaving the store?
A.

Just t h e manager to get t h e store stamp — or

9

11

store stamp.

11

Q.

Okay. Is there a document you fill out when

12
13

you leave the store?

14

A.

Yeah, and Market West gives us that.

14

15

Q.

Let me show you something and ask you if —

15

and I'm just going to use the first page, Tyler.

17
18

Q.

6

10

16

No, it takes about 20 minutes to clean up,

Yeah.

assistant manager, whatever they have, to give us the

13

A.

and that's w h a t w e give ourselves.

A.

10

12

than 5:00?

Let's mark this as Exhibit 1, if we can.

any Smith's employees supervise you?
A.

No.

Q.

Did any Smith's employees check up to see how

much product had been given out?
A.

No, not a t all.

Q.

Steve, on that day do you recall spilling a

glass of water at any time in the area of the store?

16

A.

No. No.

17

Q.

Okay. During the course of that day, did you

18

Does this look familiar to you?

Smith's employees that you haven't already discussed?

19

A.

Yep, my own hand.

19

20

Q.

Okay. Is that the document —

20

see anyone else spill anything while you were demo-ing?
A-

Not while I was demoing or any time around

it, huh-uh.

21

A.

Yeah.

21

22

Q.

— that you would fill out?

22

you see any spill of any kind on the floors of the

23

A.

The exact document t h a t w e filled out.

23

Smith's store?

24

Q.

Okay. That's all your handwriting?

24

A.

No, not at all.

25

A.

Yeah. Well, except for — let's see. I'm

25

Q.

Okay. And is it fair to say, because you

26

Q.

Okay. Did you - while you were demoing, did

28

Q.

Different products 7

1

A.

Different products. So I'd never actually

2

done t h e m e a t and cheese before except for at this demo.

3

Q.

Just at Smith's 7

4

A.

Just at Smith's. And then, you know, there

5

around it 7
A.

No, not at all. I t would have been nice

sometimes, but no.
MR. LARSEN: Okay
I have

That is all the questions

I don't know if Tyler has any further

was, you know, every other type of product you possibly

6

MR. YOUNG: Do you mind if I ask a few 7

could imagine w e demoed.

7

MR. EDWARDS: By all means

Q.

Okay. Were your procedures different, say,

if you were at Wal-Mart or Albertsons or Macey's —
A.

8
9

No.

EXAMINATION
BY MR. YOUNG:

10
7

Q.

Steve, you said sometimes - and I don't mean

Q.

- - a s far as checking in and checking out

11

you, in particular, but demo folks, might leave a mess

A.

No.

12

behind sometimes. And so you said you might see them

Q.

Was it different than when you were at

13

leave trash or something like that

14

up 7

Smith's 7
A.

Same thing. Go find the manager of

whatever — you know, whatever product they're in and
just set up where w e w a n t to set up —

Who would clean that

15

A.

I guess the store.

16

Q.

And can you think of a specific example of

17

that, or is it just that it seems like there were some of

18

those in your memory 7

Q.

Okay

A.

— close to our product or whatever.

19

Q.

So you would say all your answers you gave to

20

A.

Yeah, there's j u s t — I don't know any

specifics.

Steven earlier with regards to checking in and checking

21

out and the equipment you were provided with, all that

22

other stores, stores other than Smith's, if you ever

stuff that you answered with regards to Smith's would

23

remember anybody walking back to check the area where

apply to Albertsons —

24

you'd been after you cleaned up.

A.

That's right.

Q.

Q.

John asked you if — when you go into these

25

A.

Right.

-- Wal-Mart, all that 7

1

Q.

Do you ever remember somebody with — during

2

37
L
1

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

So I'm just going to ask a few more specific

4

questions about that

If you were at Albertsons, after

39

your presence, going back to an area and physically

3

checking the area you'd been at to maks sure it's check

4

or clear 7

5

leaving, did they have anybody, a store employee, check

5

A.

No.

6

the floor, check the area where you were at 7

6

Q.

Never remember that from another store 7

MR. EDWARDS: Did you mean at Albertsons 7

7

A.

No.

(BY MR. LARSEN) Excuse me. Any store

8

Q.

What about if you noticed areas where other

7
8

Q.

9

besides Smith's

0
1

MR. EDWARDS: Thank you.

10

(BY MR. LARSEN) Sorry. So Wal-Mart,

people had booths set up on a Saturday 7 After those
people had left, maybe they're leaving at the same time,

11

but do you ever recall a store employee ever walking to

2

Macey's, Albertsons, did they ever have anybody come and

12

those areas and checking those areas after 7

3

check the area where you were cleaning 7

13

A.

Not to my knowledge.

14

Q.

You hadn't noticed it 7

15

A.

No.

Q.

But that doesn't necessarily mean it wouldn't

4
5

Q.

9

A.

No, no one did t h a t . They didn't expect it

of us either.
7

6

Q.

So there were no policies or requirements

7

A.

Yeah, no policies or requirements on that.

16
17

happen 7

I f w e cleaned it up, w e cleaned it up. I've seen

18

A.

Yeah, I never seen it.

L9

demo-ers leave trash behind. And that's one thing I

19

Q.

So maybe other stores had policies in place

10

never did. I t just not part of my habit, so...

20

8

7

that you just weren't aware of where they were checking

21

the area like where you're demo booth had been, but you

22

just aren't aware, one way or another, whether they did

Did any of these stores, meaning

23

that 7

24

Albertsons, Macey's, Wal-Mart, did any of them ever

24

MR. EDWARDS: Objection. Speculation.

25

provide you with a floor mat to place under your booth or

25

THE WITNESS: I'm not s j r e one way or

Zl

Q.

So no place ever required it

12

A.

No.

23

Q.

Okay

38

40

1

1

another

2

Q.

(BY MR. YOUNG) Do you ever recall having a

2

FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. EDWARDS:

3

mess with the demo, I mean at any store, where you just

3

Q.

Can I ask just a couple follow-up questions 7

4

needed some help cleaning it up because you didn't have

4

A.

No problem.

Q.

You mentioned earlier that you worked for two

5

the supplies or whatever

6

A.

7

5

No, never. I t was very light stuff. I f w e

6

different demo companies, is that correct 7

7

had to do anything, it was — y e a h , t h e r e was usually not

7

8

a mess I couldn't clean up.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

That's illegal. You can't do that.
And let me ask you what was the other name of

9

Q.

Do you recall in other stores if there's any

A.

Yeah, I w o r k e d for — not at the same time.
But-

10

kind of a policy or anything like that where they require

10

Q.

11

you to do your own cleaning after you leave 7 I assume --

11

other company 7

12

you said the messes are pretty easy and you usually do

12

A.

Classic Demos.

13

it

13

Q.

Did you work for Classic Demos before or

But do you ever remember a policy of other stores

7

14

saying if you make a mess, it's your mess, you better

14

15

clean it up 7

15

A.

I t would have been before that time.

16

Q.

How long did you work for Classic Demos 7

17

A.

I don't even know. I ' m not sure. I t wasn't

16

A.

No.
7

after

17

Q.

Nothing like that

18

A.

No.

18

19

Q.

There's been some testimony in this case that

19

Q.

Would it have been less than a year 7

20

Chuck Brown, I think the store manager of the Smith's in

20

A.

Yeah.

21

question here, says that — I may screw this up just a

21

Q.

Did Classic Demos provide training as to what

22

little bit. And Steve, you can correct me if I'm wrong.

22

But I think generally he said on the day in

very long.

one does 7

23

A-

Same — basically, the same thing.

24

question he remembers your booth being there and he

24

Q.

Okay. But by the time you went to Market

25

remembers seeing, I think, a cup of drinking water on

25

23

Source West, you had already been a demo-er before so you
43

41
1

your table. And Chuck says he remembers that very

2

vividly.

3

Now, I think you testified earlier that you

1
2

A.

Right, yeah.

3

Q.

Okay.

A.

I m e a n t h e paperwork was a little different,

4

don't remember having water, and it's generally not your

4

5

policy to have like a cup of water on the table

5

6
7
8
9

but that's about it.

A.

Right.

6

Q.

If Chuck were to say, "No, I absolutely

7

question, April 2nd, 2005, did you see any water spills

8

next to the meat coolers 7

remember that," would your — I mean, your testimony was
that generally that wasn't your policy. But if there

9

10

were evidence to the contrary, would you say that, okay,

10

11

it's possible, you could have had a cup of water 7

11

12

kind of knew the process

7

A.

No.
7

Q.

A.

Okay

And then let me ask. On the day in

Not that I could recall.
MR. EDWARDS: Okay. That's all I have.

Anything else 7

12

MR. YOUNG: No more

13

MR. EDWARDS: We appreciate you coming in and

13

Q.

You don't think it was possible

14

A.

I t ' s not possible at all.

14

having your deposition taken

15

Q.

Okay. Now, why is that 7 Because you worked

15

review the deposition transcript

16
17
18
19

for that company for a year, right 7

You have the right to
Everything that we've

16

said is written up, and there's a deposition transcript

A.

Right.

17

You have the right to review it just to make sure that

Q.

Okay. And so you think in a year you never

18

everything is correct, or you can waive that right. What

19

would you like 7

had a cup of water on a table or a drink of water 7

20

A.

21

Q. Okay.

21

22

A.

I didn't do that. I w o u l d go to t h e drinking

22

MR. EDWARDS: Okay.

23

THE WITNESS: I don't need to look at it

Okay

24

MR. EDWARDS: Okay. Well, listen, we

23
24
25

No, never.

20

fountain.
Q.

Is it possible t h e r e - - t h a t ' s it

don't have anything else

I

7

25
42

THE WITNESS: It doesn't matter to me. I
guess I'll waive that right.

appreciate you coming in
44
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

A. They're like a Wal-Mart. They were here
in Utah for a while, a Wal-Mart type set-up.
(Door opens, Mr. Allen Young enters.)
Q. BY MR. TYLER YOUNG: All right. So you
worked for Gibson Discount after college how long?
A. I was with them 35 years - excuse me 13
years, sorry.
Q. I was going to say, you didn't look that

9 old.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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19
20
21
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23
24
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A. No. 13 years.
Q. All right. And did you have any other
jobs while you were with them?
A. No; I didn't, huh-uh (negative).
Q. Okay. What was your next job after
working with Gibson?
A. After that I worked for Smith's. I've
been with Smith's 20 years.
Q. Okay. When you were with Gibson Discount,
what were your duties? I guess we could start at the
beginning. What did you do when you started working
there?
A. Total store operation. I was also a buyer
for them. I went overseas a couple times a year,
went to Dallas, went to Chicago to do buying for
them. But I managed the store in Murray.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
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16
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Q. Okay. Were you always in Murray?
A. I was.
Q. All right. So 13 years with them. Did
Smith's hire you away or did you just -A. No. Gibson's actually went out of
business.
Q. Okay.
A. Then I went to work for Smith's right
after.
Q. All right. What are your duties with
Smith's? What do you do there?
A. Total store operation. We have 70
employees and just total store operation. Sales,
profit, expenses, total operation of the store inside
and outside the store are my responsibility.
Q. Okay. Has that always been your
responsibility there or have you moved up?
A. It's always been that, uh-huh
(affirmative).
Q. Okay. Now, what store is it that-A. I manage a store in American Fork on 240
Northwest State Road, American Fork, Utah. Store
number 67, that's our store number.
Q. Okay. I want to talk just for a minute
generally about stores that set up booths and kind of

August 8, 2007
7
1 goodies on Saturdays that I've seen. In this case I
2 know we've had some discussion with the other
3 attorneys that there's been one of these companies
4 that's been involved. I don't know if you've had a
5 chance to talk with your attorney about that or
6 anything. But can you tell me generally what you
7 call these companies? Are they vendors?
8
A. They're called demo companies. And I
9 believe the way they operate, basically is the
10 vendor -- the manufacturer, say if it was
11 Lynn Wilson's or Nalley's or whoever, they probably
12 pay the demo agency monies. And then the demo agency
13 employs people. And then they're the ones that go
14 out to the stores and do the demos for the products.
15 And then I would think that from that point the demo
16 company ekes out their profit, pretty much.
17
Q. Okay.
18
A. That's how they operate. They're-they
19 handle that pretty much that way.
20
Q. So the demo companies generally aren't the
21 companies that are making the food products or
22 whatever they're doing there in the stores 23
A. Correct.
24
Q. -- they're just demoing it?
25
A. Correct.

8

6
1
2
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Q. Okay. Can you just generally kind of tell
me what the business of demoing encompasses?
A. Demoing actually is - they're, like I
say, the demo company has them come in on behalf of
the manufacturer. And they demo - it could be
Nalley's Chili. It could be - in this case we're
talking about, it was cheese and lunch meats for a
company. I t could be a variance. And on Saturdays,
we might have, you know, one or two demos, three. I t
just depends. We may have none, you know.
Q. All right
A. It's all pre-set by Smith's though. I
don't set it up. It's pre-set by the company. They
have to go out to certain stores and demo for a
certain period of time.
Q. Okay. I want to talk about that just for
a minute, the pre-setting, How were those contracts
negotiated? Are they negotiated with Smith's
corporate office?
A. They are negotiated with Smith's corporate
office. I don't have anything to do with that.
Other than they call me and tell me I'm going to be
in your store on Saturday afternoon. I say, fine.
Usually the only other question they would ask you
would be if you have the product. We would say yes

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

Chuck Brown
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or no. You know, normally we do.
Q. Who is it at the corporate office that
deals with that?
A. That I don't know. Because it varies.
You would have to probably check with corporate on
that how it's set up. It's pre-set because it's
various departments. It could be a grocery item. It
could be a meat item. It could be a service deli
item. It varies, you know. I'm sure we have
somebody at corporate that could answer that. They
set all that up with the demo company. They're set
up in advance. And they go to different stores on a
weekly basis.
Q, Do you know who it would be that could
tell us who would be in charge of that, who would be
in charge of negotiating the contract?
A. Boy, I don't know. I don't. You'd have
to call the corporate - if you call the corporate
number, they could connect you. There's an operator
there at corporate. 974-1400 is our corporate
number, area code 801. And then they could connect
you. The operator on the phone is the corporate
operator. They could connect you to the proper
person that does that.
Q, All right, Who is in charge of overseeing

11
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If it's a product like, say, Nalley's Chili or Hormel
Chili, they will scan the empty canisters, like we
would a sale, and everything scans off a UPC. And
then they just pay us.
Q. Do you have somebody in charge of that or
do you do it yourself?
A. They just go to the checkstand usually.
It's an honor system with' them.
Q. Yeah, They just grab the product and walk
it up to the checkstand and run it through -A. Or we'll give it to them. Sometimes we
have product in the back and we'll give it to them to
make sure they've got plenty of product. Not only
the fact they sample it out, but they have to have
product there with them if people wanted to buy chili
or stewed beef or whatever it is. We have it there
and they could buy it. Usually we set them up close
to the product they're demoing.
Q, I just want to narrow down the "we" just
so I can be specific with this if I get there later
on. Do you tell them where to go in the store?
A. They usually check in with me, and then
ask me where should we set up. I'll try to give them
a location that's got, you know, high visibility by
the customer and it's close to the product. In this
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case we're talking about, it was service deli items,
cheeses and meats, sliced meats. And those items we
have to slice them ourselves because they have to be
sanitary with gloves and all that. The sampling he
did that day, he had a platter that he cut up
product. And I believe he had it on some crackers.
And that's how he was giving it to the customer.
Then he'd have some napkins there and a waste can.
Q. These guys that come in and demo, are they
ever store employees?
A. No.
Q. Do you ever have employees A. I've never had - 1 don't know. They're
not my store employees. I doubt it. I think it's a
private enterprise that handles that. I'm not saying
that they might not hire one of our people to do it
part time or on the side. I don't know. I'm not
aware of it. I've not -- I've never recognized
anybody there that's been with Smith's. They're
usually outside people.
Q. Are there things that you require of these
folks in your store? Are there policies or
procedures they have to follow in your store?
A. Well, usually they're pre-trained from
their company. They have to be sanitary. They have
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these folks at your store generally?
A. At our store, pretty much they're on their
own. I just know when they're coming. They will ask
me where to set up pretty much. They'll set up close
to the product. And then they will tell me what time
they're going be there. And that's pretty much it.
It's pretty much pre-set. Our main concern is just
that we - we have the product to demo.
Q. So you provide the product?
A. Uh-huh (affirmative).
Q. And they demo it?
A. Right. Then they pay for the product that
they - the product they sample to the customer, they
pay for that usually when they leave. Because the
store, the inventory is charged to me. So if they're
going to say, in this case it was hams and cheeses,
if they sampled and gave away, say, ten pounds of
product, that would be shrinked to me in my store.
But they'd track what they sample, and then they just
pay for it like a regular - they pay retail.
Q. Who tracks what they give away?
A. We pretty much work - we do, with them.
Then they just pay us for it. Usually a lot of times
if it's canned items, they will just show us the
cans, then they will go scan them out the front end.
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to be safe. They have to have good customer
relations. And usually they do, within reason,
Q. So you don't have any policies or
procedures either, you and your stores, Smith's?
Overall do you have any policies or procedures they
need to follow while they're there?
A, No. They don't work for us. So it's
assumed they're pre-trained,
Q. All right.
A. To some degree I'm sure they are.
Q, But if they're in your store, you don't
have any policies to say, look, when you're in our
store, you've got to do these things?
A. No,
Q. I'm going to come back to that in just a
minute. Do you know if Smith's corporate requires
these folks to carry insurance?
A. I don't know for a fact. But usually our
rule is they have to be insured and bonded before
they will ever come into our store, anybody. Even
our floor crew, janitors. We have outside floor
service in all of our stores, and they all have to be
bonded. I would think so. I would - not for sure,
but knowing our company, I would say they have to be
insured or bonded before they even let them. Even
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people doing work on our stores, maintenance work
outside. We do a lot of our own maintenance. But
people we hire on the outside maintenance to do
things, they check them out pretty close to make sure
they're insured and everything. So in case something
does happen, they're responsible, you know, So we're
pretty carefully I think as a company.
Q. Who makes sure that they're bonded before
they come into your store?
A. That would be somebody at corporate,
whoever sets up the demo. Whoever is working with
the demo people and that, I'm sure they're checking
that they have insurance and everything. I'm sure
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when they're demoing and make sure we have the
product They usually don't give us the time. They
usually a make sure we have the product.
Q. Do you either call corporate or does
corporate ever call you and say these folks are
bonded and insured and meet all the requirements, or
pretty much when they call you, you<assume they're
ready to the come to the store?
A. We just assume they are. I've got to
think that corporate has really checked it out
Q. Once a vendor is set up in your store
there in American Fork, is there anybody in your
store that oversees the operation of the vendors
while they're conducting business?
A. Not really. I walk the store quite often.
And I might just chat with them for a minute, you
know, how is it going, are you selling product. You
know, sometimes it may -- maybe the location isn't
right for them, maybe we've got to move to a
different location to give them some more traffic.
But generally it's, how are you doing, are you
selling the product, you know. They're pretty much
on their own because they're on instruction from
their company on what to do.
Q, For example, I've seen them before that
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will cook stuff, and they'll have a little fire
going. Do you or does somebody in the store try to
check on that fire to make sure they're not going to
burn your store down or A. We never usually have that kind of demo.
The worst scenario for us would be a fry pan, they
put a fry pan in and they're doing something that
way. I've never seen a fire or anything like that.
Like I say, the worst scenario is fry pan. A lot of
demos are not even that. I t could be something cold
or a canned product or whatever. In this case it was
just hams and cheeses, you know. But fry pans are
probably the worst scenario.
Q. What about other things like water,
grease, that kind of thing? Do you ever walk around
and make sure they're not spilling stuff on the
floor? Does anybody in your store do that?
A. Yes. We have -- what we do, we inspect
our floors once to twice per hour. I have a person
that goes around. We have to punch a clock saying
that we are going to walk the store. And we actually
go beyond that. We're required once per hour to
inspect our store. We sometimes will go as much as
twice, it depends. And that's just one of our store
clerks walking around and then looking for spills or
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Q. I just want to jump back just for a
minute. If the corporate office calls you and says
we've got some folks that want to demo meats or
cheeses, or whatever product it is, they call you and
tell you they're going to come in. Do they tell you
to expect a phone call from the demo person or how do
you k n o w - A. Usually the demo person calls usually four
to five days in advance. They're usually in the
store Friday or Saturday, usually a weekend. That's
when they're the busiest They call and let us know
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sweeping or anything, you know, picking up, It's
just walking the perimeter of the store, plus the
aisles. And we punch -- we call it a sweep. We
punch it in, so legally we've actually walked our
store. And we have a time and a person that's done
that.
And then the store has got a lot of floor
cones, paper towels down the aisles that we put up if
there is something. We can put it up and take care
of the issue. Sometimes the customer will call us.
Usually we notice it ourself or an employee will take
care of it. We have precautionary cones and paper
towels on all the aisles.
Q. I think you've already answered a couple
of these I was just about to go over. I apologize if
I didn't get your answer on these the first time
around originally. So when the vendors get to your
store, they usually check in, you said, and you'll
help them find the location they need to go?
A. Correct
Q. If it's meats and cheeses, you put them by
the meats?
A. In this case it was by the service deli,
and that's where we put them.
Q. They just walk right into the store and

paid from the vendors, I believe. I don't think
Smith's pays the demo company. I think the vendors,
like Nalley's and Kraft and those people, pay the
demo company because they're demoing their product as
part of their advertizing allowance. And then the
demo company pays these people that work for them.
And then between that they eke out their profit. I'm
sure that's how it works."
Q. Usually there's a table that they set up.
Do you know who provides that table?
A. Sometimes they have a table, and sometimes
we'll help them out. If they don't have a table,
then we've got some tables that we furnish for them
if they want to use them.
Q. What are their-A. Generally they have their own table,
though.
Q. What about their other equipment, like if
they're cooking or knives or A. They furnish all their equipment.
Everything is furnished by them. Fry pans, all that
stuff is furnished by their company.
Q. In this case you said they were giving out
meats, So was it your deli that was actually cutting
the meat?
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say I'm looking for Chuck?
A. They ask for the person in charge usually,
Then they direct them to me, and I'll talk to them
and help them get set up.
Q. Is there any paperwork they fill out?
A. Usually there's paperwork when they get
done. They have paperwork that they sign off that
they're done.
Q. What's that paperwork?
A. Basically what the paperwork is for, it
just - most of it is just the time they were there,
make sure they're not cheating their demo company of
time. So their sign-out time, their signing-out time
that they were there.
Q. And I think you said this is a corporate
thing, but do you know how they get paid, the demo
folks?
A. I don't. I would think the demo company
pays them. They work for the demo company, That's
how they get paid.
Q, Those are the folks that are in the stand?
A. The demo company, they work for that
company. They're a demo person that just works for
that company. Then they come in and work in the
store. The demo company itself, I think they get
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A. I think what we were doing, we were
probably slicing the meats and cheeses in large
pieces. And then they would take it probably on
their own platter, cut it up into smaller pieces, and
put it on crackers. Then they bring their own
napkins and they pretty well do it that way. Then we
charge them for whatever product they ask us to
slice.
Q. What about coolers, if they need coolers
to keep their food cool? I assume at Smith's, they
usually get their food from Smith's A. A lot of them have these little portable
coolers they bring. Sometimes they have their own.
Sometimes we furnish ice. They have their cooler and
put everything in there.
Q. Do you k n o w A. Usually they'll slide it under their
table, and they'll operate out of that.
Q. Do you know what this company had, in this
case?
A. I don't remember. It's been a couple
years since we've had this case, this issue. So I
don't remember on this one. I actually don't think
he had anything because he was getting product from
us as he needed it. We were just selling it to him.
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1 Then they would cut it up and put it on crackers, and
2 then they were putting it out for customers to
3 sample,
4
Q, In the times where the folks come in and
5 they're actually doing cooking on the frying pan, do
6 you provide the frying pan?
7
A. No, They have their own.
8
Q. Do vendors like this often bring in their
9 own water and coolers and things?
10
A. They do, Well, the coolers, they have
11 their own coolers. If they needed water or
12 something, they'd ask us and, you know, we'd do
13 whatever they need, you know,
14
MR, HILBIG: Counsel, in this question you
15 were asking about a vendor -16
MR, TYLER YOUNG: Yeah, I'm sorry, demos.
17 I could be more clear.
18
Q. BY MR, TYLER YOUNG: Is that still your
19 answer, with the demo company?
20
A. They have their own, pretty much have
21 their own.
22
Q. What about lubricants?
23
A. They would have their own, Usually if
24 it's Pam or something they had to spray on the fry
125 pan or something, they have their own stuff. If they
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22
needed stuff, they'd just buy it, They give them
money to buy.
They don't have an account or anything.
We used to do that, years ago. They had some kind of
account thing. I t ended up not getting paid, and
then Smith's would end up losing. So we make sure
they have their own stuff, They have to have all
their own everything, fry pans and lubricants,
everything when they come in there, They actually
just purchase it. I think the demo person just gives
your a receipt and then they just get reimbursed from
their company, which is the demo company.
Q. Does Smith's have a policy that when these
folks pick up their booth and leave or they pick
everything up, when I say these folks I mean the
folks doing the demos, do they go inspect that area?
A. No. Huh-uh (negative). We don't.
Q. All right. Who generally cleans up after
the demo people leaves?
A, Our policy with them is they clean up
their area, And it's never been a problem, you know.
Q. Is that a written policy?
A, I would think that -- now, I didn't write
the policy. But I'm sure when they set it up at the
corporate level, that's probably their agreement they
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1 have to clean up their area, yeah, Because it's
2 clean when they come, and it's clean when they leave,
3 If they have any trash or anything on the floor, you
4 know, whatever, it has to be clean.
5
Q, What about cleaning supplies and things7
6
A. That would b e - t h a t would be them
7 entirely. I mean if they needed paper towels or
8 something, we'd furnish it to them if they asked us,
9 you know. We're good that way.
10
Q. Have you ever actually seen them bring
11 their own cleaning supplies in?
12
A. No. Usually they don't have a mess. It's
13 usually they have a table cover on their table and
14 usually it's like a paper table cover. So they will
15 just throw it away and it's done, you know. They
16 will have a garbage can under their table, and they
17 will bring their own garbage can. They will just
18 clean up that way. In the worst scenario they ask us
19 where the trash is, the trash area. They will
20 deposit their trash in the trash area of the store
21 and be gone. So usually it's just a matter of taking
22 the table cover off and emptying their trash and
23 picking up themselves and they're done. That's
24 usually how it works. I've never had an instance in
25 20 years where they had an issue when they left, you
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24
know.
Q. Can you remember any time that somebody
said, oh, hey, we've had a spill, can you send your
people over to clean it up?
A. Usually they'll clean it up. If there's
an issue, it's usually a small issue. They're just
working off a table in an area right there. Yeah,
they know they're responsible for their area.
Q. Other than in this case, have you ever had
an experience where somebody from one of these booths
has actually made a mess or something that somebody
has slipped on or ever A. I have not. I have not.
Q. Okay. Now, I just want to talk about
general Smith's store policies for a minute. Are you
the safety person in charge at your store, or is
there somebody else that's in charge of that?
A. My assistant manager is our safety person.
But I'm over my assistant, so I'm really responsible
for the entire store,
Q. Who's the assistant manager?
A. At that time it was BJ, Phillips.
Q, Thank you.
A. He's now located at the Saratoga store,
Saratoga Smith's, He's been transferred to that
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